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NOTES
Voluntary Warriors: Reserve Force
Mobilization in the United States and
Canada
Kevin D. Hartzell*
Introduction
International peacekeeping' deployments have become more frequent in
recent times. More peacekeeping missions will undoubtedly be needed as
the collapse of communism and the resurfacing of ethnic rivalries reshape
the world.2 As the number of international peacekeeping deployments
increase, the need for peacekeeping troops will also increase. Simultane-
ously, the end of the Cold War places great fiscal pressure on nations to
reduce expenditures on armed forces.3 One method of maintaining a rela-
tively large and accessible military force is for nations to rely more heavily
on reserve augmentation of the active duty military forces.
This Note will review, compare, and contrast the statutory frameworks
for reserve force mobilization in the United States and Canada. The Cana-
dian Armed Forces (CF) have a voluntary mobilization system, such that
Canadian reservists cannot be deployed internationally without their indi-
vidual consent. Although considerably more complex than that of Canada,
* Associate, Kutak Rock, Omaha, Nebraska; J.D., Comell Law School, 1996; B.S.,
United States Military Academy, 1989.
1. One definition of peacekeeping is:
An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers,
undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international
peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are
based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military per-
sonnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them
with the "enforcement action" of the United Nations under Article 42.
UNrrm NATIONs, THE BLUE HEhmirs: A RmEv OF UNmD NATIONs PEACEKEEPING 4-5
(1991).
2. For a detailed discussion of peacekeeping operations, and in particular the legal
issues surrounding them, see id.; N.D. WHInE, KEEPING THE PEACE (1993); THE EVOLUrnON
oF UN PEACEKEEPING (William J. Durch ed., 1993).
3. JEFmY A. JACOBS, THE FuTuRE OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER FORCE 1 (1994).
29 CoRNEIu. INT' LJ. 537 (1996)
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the U.S. reserve mobilization framework is voluntary as well. However, the
U.S. system is more conducive to voluntary mobilization because of the
greater size of the U.S. reserves and because of statutory rights granted to
reservists.
Part I of this Note examines the U.S. reserve component structure, U.S.
military reliance on the reserves, and the statutory framework for mobiliz-
ing reserve forces. Part II analyzes the statutory framework for U.S. reserve
mobilization, a system which, despite its complexity, results in a voluntary
system of reserve mobilization except in time of war or national emergency.
Part III describes the Canadian Armed Forces reserve structure, the degree
of Canadian reliance on reserves, and the statutory framework for the
mobilization of Canadian reserves. Part IV compares the U.S. and Cana-
dian reserve mobilization policies and reconciles the apparent differences
in the two statutory frameworks. This Note concludes that a statutory
framework for the mobilization of reserves which relies upon voluntary
mobilization does not handicap deployments in support of multinational
missions, such as U.N. peacekeeping.
I. U.S. Reserves
A. U.S. Reserve Component Structure
There are seven individual components in the reserve force structure of the
U.S. Armed Forces:4 Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve,
Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air
National Guard.5 Reserve personnel are divided into three categories:
Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. 6 Members of the
4. SjoUKE DEJONG, NATO'S RasEvE FORcES 104 (1992). Reserve forces augment the
numbers and/or capabilities of the standing armed forces with individuals or units.
Reserve forces do not train full-time; rather, they consist of individuals who either have
prior military service with the standing army or who train part-time with various reserve
force units. In either case, reservists generally have full-time civilian employment. With
reserves, a standing military force may be significantly increased in size and capability
in a relatively short time. The cost of maintaining a modem standing army the size of
the reserve-augmented force is significantly greater than the cost of the reserve forces.
The expertise required of a modem fighting force generally forbids the conscription of
untrained civilians to augment the standing military in a short or moderate time frame.
In 1991, available U.S. forces numbered 3.140 million individuals, 1.965 million on
active duty and 1.115 million in the Selected Reserve. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, STRUCTURING U.S. FoRcES AFTR THE COLD WAR: CosTs AND EFFECTs OF
INCREASED REUANCE ON THE Rzs.vEs 1-26 (1992) [hereinafter CBO RESERVE STUDY]. In
October of 1994, available U.S. forces numbered 2.636 million personnel, 1.608 million
on active duty and 1.028 million in the Selected Reserve. Eric Schmitt, Military Planning
Expanded Role for the Reserves, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al, A22.
5. DE JoNG, supra note 4, at 104.
6. The categories of reserve personnel essentially correspond to the order in which
reservists would be activated and required to serve on active duty. The Ready Reserve,
which generally consists of individuals who train regularly with their assigned units,
would be activated first. The Standby Reserve consists of individuals in the reserves and
in vital government positions. The Standby Reserve does not regularly train. The
Retired Reserve consists of individuals who have retired from the active forces or
reserves. They would be activated last. See CBO RESERVE STUDY, supra note 4, at 2-6;
DEJONG, supra note 4, at 104-06.
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Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are drawn only from the
Ready Reserve, while the members of the remaining five reserve compo-
nents are drawn from all three personnel categories. 7
The Ready Reserve consists of four elements: Selected Reserve, Indi-
vidual Ready Reserve, Inactive National Guard, and Training Pipeline.8
Personnel in the Selected Reserve train periodically for military duty and
may be called to active service.9 This military training obligation is typi-
cally about forty days each year and is generally divided into one weekend
each month and two consecutive weeks in the summer months. 10 In addi-
tion, the Selected Reserve is organized into units of individual reservists,
each with an assigned mission."
Approximately 1.2 million personnel serve in the Selected Reserve. 12
Selected reservists comprise the entire Army and Air National Guard, and
portions of the reserve forces of the four active services. 13 All other reserve
elements and categories are non-drilling, in that their members do not
train for military duties and are not organized into units with an assigned
mission.14 Generally, the mission of the units which comprise the Selected
Reserve is to augment the active services with operationally-ready units
with minimal notice.' 5
B. U.S. Force Structure: Increasing Reliance on the Reserves
In 1970, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the "total force concept"
as a result of the failure of the nonmobilization policy in Vietnam and the
impending end of military conscription.' 6 This concept envisioned reserv-
7. DEJONG, supra note 4, at 104.
8. The Selected Reserve is the largest element and consists of reservists organized
into units with assigned missions who train on a regular basis. The Individual Ready
Reserve is comprised of individuals who have left active service but still maintain reserve
duty obligations. Individual Ready Reservists are not assigned to units and do not train.
The Inactive National Guard consists of individuals, usually specialists with essential
skills, who report to their assigned unit annually, but do not train with the unit. The
Training Pipeline consists of reservists who have not yet completed initial training. See
DEJONG, supra note 4, at 104-05.
9. Id.
10. CBO REsavE STUDY, supra note 4, at 3.
11. DE JONG, supra note 4, at 105.
12. CBO RasEaiVE STUDY, supra note 4, at 4; Schmitt, supra note 4, at Al, A22.
13. CBO REsERVE SruDy, supra note 4, at 4. The four active services are the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Coast Guard reservists fall under the Department of
Transportation. Id.
14. Id. at 4-5. These include the Standby Reserve, composed of personnel in key
government positions, DEJONG, supra note 4, at 105 (approximately 38,000 personnel),
the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard, comprised of personnel who
have previously served in the active military or National Guard (approximately 600,000
personnel), and the Retired Reserve, composed of retired military personnel receiving
pensions (approximately 1.8 million personnel). CBO RESaVE STrMY, supra note 4, at 5-
6.
15. CBO ResEvE STUDY, supra note 4, at 1-4.
16. JAcoBs, supra note 3, at 46. Of the 3.5 million soldiers who served in Vietnam,
only 20,000 were mobilized reservists. Because political leaders were unwilling to take
the legal steps (and suffer the consequent political repercussions) of mobilizing large
numbers of citizen-soldiers, the military in Vietnam had to rely on conscripted civilians
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ists in the role draftees had played in Vietnam-readily available manpower
with which to expand the ranks of the active military. 17 Furthermore, the
concept envisioned the deployment of reserve units, rather than individual
replacements, in order to avoid repeating the failed policy of individual
rotation used in Vietnam. 18
In 1973, DoD implemented a Total Force Policy, based on the total
force concept, "which integrate[s] the active duty, National Guard and the
other Reserve forces into [a] homogeneous whole." 19 This policy envi-
sioned a much larger role for reserve forces in the operations of the armed
forces. 20 Operational use of reserve forces was not to be a last resort;
reserve forces were envisioned in the vanguard, fighting alongside active
duty units.21 Under the Total Force Policy, the reserves were to be an inte-
gral part of the U.S. Armed Forces; the intended relationship between
active and reserve forces was that of equal partners in peacetime and war.22
Operational readiness was not the sole reason for the Total Force Pol-
icy; reserve units in peacetime cost less than active duty units and, theoreti-
cally, demonstrate the same or nearly the same combat capabilities. 23 The
for manpower. Thus, the war in Vietnam was fought largely by a draftee army. Id. This
policy of nornmobilization of the reserve forces was arguably unwise from a military
perspective. Compare BRUCE PALMER, JR., THE 25-YEAR WAR: AmoucA's MILITARY ROLE IN
VIErNAM 175 (1984) ("Th[e] failure to mobilize... resulted in a steady deterioration of
American forces, not only in Southeast Asia but also in other areas, especially in Europe,
where a once magnificent American field army became singularly unready, incapable of
fulfilling its NATO mission.") with HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY 1 (1982) ("On
the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable."). One of the political effects of the
nonmobilization policy was the loss of support of the American people for the war in
Vietnam. Id. at 13-16. Generally, the mobilization and deployment of reserve forces was
allowed only on approval by elected representatives, arguably answerable to the popular
will. Thus, the support of the American people was built into the reserve force structure
of the military. Id.
17. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 46. The "total force concept" also sought to rectify both
the perceived and real changes in the reserves as a result of the nonmobiization policy.
Resources were diverted to the active Army to support the Vietnam conflict, and the
reserves were relegated to third-rate status. The reserves were also not perceived as the
fighting force they were intended to be; many draft-age citizens, understanding the
nonmobilization policy, enlisted in the reserves merely to avoid service in Vietnam. Id.
As many as 70 percent of those enlisting in the reserves in the Vietnam era did so to
avoid Vietnam. Id.
18. Id.
19. OFFICE OF THE SECRErARY OF DEFENSE, RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR
1988: REPORT OF THE RESERvE FORCES POLICY BOARD i (1989) (quoting U.S. President
George Bush).
20. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 47.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Total Force Policy was implemented when the threat of major Soviet
military action was high. Reserve units were expected to be mobilized in a scenario of
near-complete or complete military mobilization to counter such an attack. In this con-
text, reserve brigades (3,000-6,000 personnel) were expected to arrive in the combat
theater twenty-nine days after mobilization, and the active Army could not deploy a com-
bat force of more than five or six divisions (80,000-120,000 personnel) without reserve
mobilization. Id.
23. Kenneth M. Theurer, Low-Level Conflicts and the Reserves: Presidential Authority
Under 10 U.S.C. § 673b, 62 U. IN. L. REv. 1135, 1142 (1994).
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cost of maintaining a reserve unit may be considerably less than its active
duty counterpart. 24 Reserve units manifestly reduce the cost of maintain-
ing the armed forces, while ostensibly providing the same, or nearly so,
fighting capabilities.2 Because of the legacy of cold war mobilization sce-
narios and fiscal imperatives, the reserve forces continue to contribute sig-
nificantly to any measure of overall military capability.
The reserves are a significant portion of the numerical and qualitative
strength of the U.S. Armed Forces, and the reserves' share of military capa-
bilities is slated for increase. For instance, in 1992, the Air National Guard
provided, for various Air Force missions, 26% of the overall force structure,
78% of the continental air defense, and 40% of the tactical air support.
26
The Army Reserve accounted for 68% of combat medical care, 68% of fuel
storage and distribution, 54% of ammunition handling, and 32% of truck
transportation capability. 27 The 1992 plan proposed by the Clinton
Administration will shift significantly more responsibilities to the reserve
components by 1997.28 Currently, some missions, such as full-mobiliza-
tion training detachments, civil affairs, and port security, are performed
24. Cost differences between reserve and active duty units in peacetime vary depend-
ing on unit type. A "heavy" division (consisting mostly of mechanized vehicles such as
tanks and armored personnel carriers) of the Army National Guard costs about 25% as
much as a heavy division of the active Army to support and maintain. Similarly, a
Marine Reserve division costs about 30% of its active duty counterpart. Naval Reserve
vessels cost nearly as much as active duty vessels, but reserve air units in the Navy and
Air Force cost approximately 30%-40% less than equivalent active duty units. CBO
RESERVE STUDY, supra note 4, at 7-9.
25. The question of whether reserve units can or do provide equivalent military
capabilities when operationally deployed is hotly debated. Reserve component forces
are generally not as "ready" as their active duty counterparts, where "readiness" is a
measure of training, personnel, and equipment. Army National Guard "line units"
(units assigned to participate in combat) are usually rated 30% or lower in training
proficiency levels than comparable active duty line units. JAcoBs, supra note 3, at 50. A
former president of the U.S. Army Training Board stated that "No matter how well we do
in peacetime training, the average [r]eserve unit will never be as combat-ready as its
active-duty counterpart Those who imply they will be as combat-ready are making a
mistake." Liz Galmey, The Sad State of Weekend Warriors, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 21, 1989, at 28. The Department of Defense (DoD), in recognition of the reduced
level of training present in reserve forces, normally assigns most missions needed in
peacetime or in the earlier stages of armed conflict to active forces. CBO RESERVE STUDY,
supra note 4, at 34.
The recent Persian Gulf conflict ("Desert Storm") highlighted some of the deficiencies
and advantages of the reserve forces. Army National Guard "line" units were least pre-
pared, and ultimately the Army refused to deploy the vast majority of these units to the
Persian Gulf due to training and personnel deficiencies. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 95-99.
Reserve combat support and combat service support units, which support line units with
intelligence, communications, and various logistical services and equipment, as well as
air combat and transport units, performed well. In some cases, these reserve forces out-
performed their active duty counterparts. SeeJohn T. Correll, The Force Mix Fight Heats
Up, AiR FORCE MAG., Jan. 1993, at 67, 70; CBO RESEvE S-UoDY, supra note 4, at 1;
Theurer, supra note 23, at 1143.
26. DE JONG, supra note 4, at 108.
27. Id. at 109.
28. Clinton Administration Plan
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exclusively by reserve components. 29
While the reserve forces comprise a significant portion of the U.S.
Armed Forces in terms of numbers and capabilities,30 this does not neces-
sarily imply that reserve forces are necessary to augment active forces in a
relatively small force deployment, the most likely type of mission under
U.N. auspices. However, the present force structure is such that DoD has
announced plans to augment active forces with the reserves in order to
meet peacetime military obligations, including peacekeeping missions.
31
Additionally, because so much of the logistical support in the U.S. Armed
Forces is the responsibility of reserve forces, any extended military deploy-
ment or operation will require logistical and other support from the
1990 1997
Army Divisions
Active 18 12
Reserve 10 8
Air Force Wings
Active 24 15
Reserve 13 11
Navy Ships
Active 515 418
Reserve 50 67
Navy Air Wings
Active 13 11
Reserve 2 2
Marine Corps Brigades
Active 9 8
Reserve 3 3
CBO RasEavE STUDY, supra note 4, at 40. Planned reductions in both the active and
reserve components are continuing:
Reserve Component End Strengths and Projections (numbers rounded to nearest
thousand)
FY93 FY94 FY95
Army National Guard 410 410 400
Army Reserve 276 260 242
Naval Reserve 132 113 101
Marine Reserve 42 42 42
Air National Guard 117 118 116
Air Force Reserve 81 82 79
DOD Total 1,058 1,025 979
National Guard and Reserve Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Force Require-
ments and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., May
10, 1994, available in NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (statement of Deborah R.
Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs). President Clinton has recently
supported proposals to further reduce the number of active Army divisions to ten, but
these proposals have met stiff opposition in Congress and are not likely to succeed.
Rowan Scarborough, GOP Will Counter Arms Cuts, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994, at Al.
29. CBO RESERVE STUDY, supra note 4, at 4.
30. Percentage of service branch on active duty and Selected Reserve as of Oct. 1,
1994:
Army Air Force Marines Navy
Active % 55.3 31.8 19.5 80.5
Reserve % 44.7 68.2 80.5 19.5
Personnel 1,211,300 625,500 216,400 582,900
Schmitt, supra note 4, at A22.
31. Id. at Al, A22.
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reserves.32 Essentially, the partnership goal of the Total Force Policy is a
present reality; the reserves are a necessary component of the U.S. military
regardless of the size and tempo of the operation.
C. The Statutory Framework for Mobilizing Reserve Forces
1. Introduction
Title 10 and Title 32 of the United States Code provide fourteen different
sources of legal authority for calling reservists to active duty.33 Title 32 is
concerned with a state's use of the National Guard.34 Reservists may not
be deployed overseas under its provisions. 35 Title 10 provides authority for
calling reservists of all components to active duty.36 The limitations of
Title 10 reserve mobilization depend on the operational nature of the
deployment and upon the actions of Congress and the President.3 7 Essen-
tially, any deployment of any members of the reserve component of the
U.S. Armed Forces for combat or overseas training will be governed by
some aspect of Tide 10. The present mobilization statutes are a compen-
dium of prior legislation 38 that generally relied upon and codified histori-
cal military practice.39
If Congress declares war or national emergency, all reservists, from
32. DEJONG, supra note 4, at 108.
33. 10 U.S.C. §§ 10147-8 (1994) (call-up of Ready Reserve for training); 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331-35 (civil insurrection or disturbance); 10 U.S.C. § 671 (for initial training); 10
U.S.C. § 12301(a) (1994) (war or national emergency declared by Congress); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12301(b) (1994) (for fifteen days annual training); 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) (1994) (vol-
untary active duty); 10 U.S.C. § 12301(g)(1) (1994) (captive status); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12302(a) (1994) (presidential declaration of national emergency); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12303(a) (1994) (for nonperformance of duty); 10 U.S.C. § 12304(a) (1994) (presi-
dential authority without declaration of national emergency); 10 U.S.C. § 12306 (1994)
(Standby Reserve); 10 U.S.C. § 12307 (1994) (Retired Reserve); 10 U.S.C. § 802 (for
judicial action under the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice); 10 U.S.C. § 6485 (Navy and
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve); 32 U.S.C. § 502 (National Guard training). See L. Dow
Davis, Reserve Callup Authorities: Time for Recall?, AMY I LAw., Apr. 1990, at 4.
34. See 32 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
35. Id.
36. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (1994) (mobilization of all reserve components); 10
U.S.C. § 12302-5 (1994) (mobilization of members of the Ready Reserve); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12303 (1994) (mobilization of members of the Ready Reserve not assigned to units);
10 U.S.C. § 12304 (1994) (mobilization of members of the Selected Reserve).
37. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301-12304 (1994).
38. See, e.g. the National Defense Act of 1916, Ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916); the
Naval Reserve Act of 1925, Ch. 374, 43 Stat. 1080 (1925); the National Defense Act of
1948, Ch. 157, 62 Stat. 87 (1948); the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Ch. 608, 66
Stat. 481 (1952); the Defense Act of 1956, Ch. 789, 70 Stat. 729 (1956).
39. The nonmobilization of the reserves in support of the Vietnam War eventually
led to the implementation of the Total Force Policy in 1973. The Total Force Policy and
more recent reserve/active force structure changes do not contemplate that a conflict on
the scale of Vietnam could possibly be fought without the use of reserve forces. However,
the use of reserves in such a deployment is governed by the limitations of Title 10, which
is presently a hodgepodge of forty years of political conflict between the Congress, DoD,
Service Branch Reserves, and the National Guard. Reserve mobilization authority and
limitations which may have been timely and appropriate some time ago may not have a
present military justification. SeeJAcoBs, supra note 3, at 42-47; Davis, supra note 33, at
6.
543
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both the service reserves 40 and the National Guard, may be called-up to
active federal service, as units or as individuals if not assigned to units,
with or without the individual reservist's consent.41 The duration of
mobilization under section 12301(a) is limited only by the length of the
war or congressionally-declared national emergency. 42 Congress last
declared war just prior to U.S. entry into World War 11.43 Section 12301(a)
is not likely to be the reserve mobilization authority for any military opera-
tion short of protracted war.
a. Presidential Authority
In the absence of a congressional declaration, the President may act unilat-
erally to mobilize reserve forces. Under 10 U.S.C. § 12304, the President
may, after his determination that it is necessary to augment the active
forces with reserves for an operational mission, order up to 200,000 mem-
bers of the Selected Reserve to active duty for a period of 270 days. 44
Within twenty-four hours of activating Selected Reserve units and individu-
als under this "200k" provision, the President must submit a written report
to Congress setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action taken
and describing the anticipated use of the activated reserve units and mem-
bers.45 A mobilization under section 12304 may be terminated by order of
40. Service Reserves refers to the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve,
and Marine Corps Reserve. Service Reserves do not include the Army National Guard or
the Air National Guard. The Ready Reserve includes the Service Reserves, the Army
National Guard, and the Air National Guard.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (1994). Section 12301(a) states in relevant part:
In time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when other-
wise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned
may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any mem-
ber not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a reserve component
under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty (other than for training)
for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter.
42. Id.
43. Since World War II, Congress has not declared war. During the Korean War,
President Truman declared a national emergency. See Proclamation No. 2914, 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1557 (Dec. 19, 1950). Congress declared a "national exigency" and not a
national emergency in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. See Southeast Asia Peace
& Security Act, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). Congress passed a resolution
authorizing the use of force in the Persian Gulf, but did not declare war or a national
emergency. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L.
102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
44. 10 U.S.C. § 12304(a) (1994). Section 12304(a) reads in relevant part:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 12302(a) or any other provision
of law, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active
forces for any operational mission, he may authorize the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is
not operating as a service in the Navy, without the consent of the members
concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized
to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve . . .to active duty (other than for
training) for not more than 270 days.
(c) Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active
duty under this section at any one time.
45. 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (1994).
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the President or by law.46 The President may not authorize an extension of
the 270 day limit.
4 7
Section 12304 does not require the President to declare a national
emergency before reserve mobilization.48 However, if the President does
declare a national emergency,49 he may order to active duty units and indi-
viduals not assigned to units of the Ready Reserve for a period not more
than twenty-four consecutive months under section 12302.50 No more
than one million Ready Reservists may be on active duty without their con-
sent under this section.51 Sections 12301 and 12302 are both unlikely to
be used in any scenario which falls short of a complete or nearly complete
U.S. mobilization in preparation for war.5 2
b. Training and Gubernatorial Consent
In the past twenty-five years,53 the authority of section 12301 and its pred-
ecessor, section 672, have provided most of the reservists for duty, particu-
larly for the annual two-week training period.54 Under section 12301(b),
DoD may order to active duty any unit or individual not assigned to a unit
for active duty, without the member's consent, for a period not in excess of
15 days.55 In order to be so ordered to active duty, the reserve unit or
46. 10 U.S.C. § 12304(g) (1994).
47. Under 10 U.S.C. § 673B, the predecessor to section 12304, the President could
mobilize the reserve forces for 90 days, and authorize a 10 day extension. For 1995, the
initial mobilization period was changaed to 270 days, and the provision for extension
deleted. See Pub. L. 103-337, § 511(a)(2) & 511(a)(1).
48. President Clinton twice ordered reservists to duty under the authority of section
673B or 12304. The first was for the U.S. Military deployment to Haiti. Exec. Order No.
12927, 30 WEmmy CoMP. PRmS. Doc. 1778 (Sept. 15, 1994). The second was to support
the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia. Exec. Order No. 12982, 31 WMCLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 2153 (Dec. 8, 1995).
49. A Presidential declaration of national emergency is governed by the National
Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (1994). President Bush declared a
national emergency to deal with Iraqi aggression in August, 1990. See Exec. Order No.
12,722, 5 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990). The reserve call-up was not authorized under this
declaration, however, and President Bush expanded the national emergency to include
the involuntary call-up of reservists under 10 U.S.C. § 673(a) after the outbreak of hos-
tilities on January 17, 1991. See Exec. Order No. 12,743, 56 Fed. Reg. 2661 (1991).
50. 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (1994). Section 12302(a) states in relevant part:
In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953,
or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary
concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit,
and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready
Reserve ... to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 24 consecu-
tive months.
51. 10 U.S.C. § 12302(c) (1994).
52. Sections 12301 and 12302 require, respectively, a congressional declaration of
war or national emergency or a presidential declaration of national emergency. These
sections allow, respectively, an unlimited number of reservists or a million reservists to
be called-up to active duty. Limited deployments are unlikely to require such large num-
bers of reservists in order to augment the active forces.
53. See Davis, supra note 33, at 8.
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(b) (1994). Section 12301(b) states:
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member must be in an "active" status.5 6 There is no explicit requirement
in section 12301(b) that the purpose of the active duty be training,
although this association is frequently made.57 Section 12301(d) allows
any reserve member to be ordered to active duty for an indefinite period
provided the individual member consents to the activation.58
The governor of a state must consent to the activation of Air or Army
National Guard units or members under section 12301(c) or 12301(d).59
This consent may not be withheld due to objection to the location, pur-
pose, type, or schedule of active duty.60 Title 10 also circumscribes the
purpose of the reserve mobilization with various terms, such as "active
duty," "active duty for training," and "active duty (other than for train-
ing)."61 The absence of such limitation on the purpose of active duty may
also lead to some confusion.62 Reserve mobilization itself does not invoke
any provisions of the War Powers Act,63 although the call-up of reserve
forces would most likely be followed, or preceded, by the commitment of
U.S. forces to hostilities, in which case the War Powers Act would be
At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without
the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not
assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve
component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more
than 15 days a year. However, units and members of the Army National Guard
of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be
ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor
of the State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia National Guard, the
commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard).
56. "Active" status, according to 10 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1994), is any member or unit
that is not in the inactive or retired reserve. Thus, section 12301(b) includes all Ready
Reservists.
57. See Davis, supra note 33, at 8.
58. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) (1994). Section 12301(d) states in relevant part:
At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may order a
member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain
him on active duty, with the consent of that member. However, a member of the
Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the
United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without
the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State
concerned.
59. See supra notes 54, 57 and accompanying text.
60. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(0(1994) states that:
The consent of a Governor described in subsections (b) and (d) may not be
withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United
States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the loca-
tion, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.
This subsection was added by the Montgomery Amendment of Oct. 30, 1986.
61. Davis, supra note 33, at 5.
62. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) ("active duty (other than for training)"); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12301(b) (no purpose of active duty specified); 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) (no purpose of
active duty specified); 10 U.S.C. § 12302(a) ("active duty (other than for training)"); 10
U.S.C § 12304 ("active duty (other than for training)"). However, 10 U.S.C. § 12314
specifies that reservists on "active duty other than for training" may be assigned to any
duty authorized by law for the regular components.
63. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994). See 10 U.S.C. § 12304(h). The War Powers Act
is applicable before the President introduces forces to hostilities or near hostilities. 10
U.S.C. § 1542 (1994).
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applicable.64
2. Legislative Background of the "200k" Provision
The President is not required to declare a national emergency to invoke
reserve mobilization under section 12304.65 However, prior to 1976,
reserve units could be involuntarily activated only after a congressional
declaration of war or national emergency, or a presidential declaration of
national emergency. 66 In 1976, section 673B67 was adopted by Congress,
although the call-up provision was limited to 50,000 reservists. 68 This
"50k" provision was limited to ninety days, and the President was author-
ized to extend the call-up for another ninety days.69 Congress intended
that this provision be used to augment the active forces for an operational
mission (hostilities or near-hostilities) and not for purposes of training or
to provide assistance during a domestic disturbance.70 Furthermore, Con-
gress sought to encourage the application of the 1973 Total Force Policy
and military reliance on the reserves. 71 Authority to augment the active
forces in an operational environment with reserve forces would leave DoD
with no reason for withholding important resources from the reserve com-
ponents.72 The greater likelihood of operational deployment and supply of
more and better resources would also improve morale and motivation
within the reserves.73
Finally, Congress intended that section 673B would allow the Presi-
dent to activate small numbers of reservists for a limited time with little
political backlash.74 The ability of the President to augment specific opera-
tional missions without a declaration of national emergency was essential
in order to avoid the potential provocativeness of such a declaration in the
international arena as well as potential domestic political fallout.7 5 Con-
gress thought it essential that the President be able to respond to a crisis in
terms more measured than a declaration of national emergency, which to
64. See Davis, supra note 33, at 10. The legality and efficacy of the War Powers Act
have been widely questioned. See, e.g., Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MI.
L. Ray. 83, 90 (1993) ("Under the [War Powers Resolution], presidents methodically
avoid formal compliance with the WPR by exploiting its arguably unconstitutional and
inartfully drafted provisions.").
65. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
66. The Russell Amendment provisions, used in the 1968-69 Vietnam call-up of
reserves, were a limited exception. Pub. L. No. 89-687, 80 Stat. 980 (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1161. President Johnson's decision not to mobilize reserve forces
was attributed to his reluctance to declare a national emergency. H.R. Rep. No. 1069,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1034, 1036.
67. Section 673B was redesignated section 12304 in 1995.
68. Pub. L. No. 94-286, 90 Stat. 517 (1976).
69. Id.
70. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1034, 1039. This distinction, however, is not explicit in this
version of section 673B or in subsequent amendments.
71. H.R. Rep. No. 1069, supra note 66, at 3-4.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Davis, supra note 33, at 10.
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some international observers is tantamount to a declaration of war.76 Sec-
tion 673B would also allow the President to activate reserve forces in prepa-
ration for, and perhaps preemption of, an impending declaration of
national emergency. 77
Congress increased the call-up limitation from 50,000 to 100,000 per-
sonnel in 1980.78 This increase was made after a series of mobilization
exercises revealed that 50,000 reserve personnel were not enough to meet
hypothetical operational requirements. 79 The legislative history suggests
that the section 673B call-up provision had lost importance as a means for
the President to mediate international tensions with action short of a decla-
ration of national emergency. Instead, Congress and DoD saw section
673B as one step in the path of full mobilization in the event of a confron-
tation with the former Soviet Union.80 The section 673B call-up provision
was increased again in 1986 from 100,000 troops to 200,000.81 While
section 673B in its present form specifies no minimum number of reservists
which may be involuntarily ordered to active duty, the recent legislative
history suggests that Congress envisioned the use of section 673B only in
times of large-scale military confrontation,82 as well as to encourage DoD
to increase their reliance upon and support of the reserve components
under the Total Force Policy.8 3
In 1995, section 673B was redesignated section 12304, and the maxi-
mum authorized period of active duty under this section was changed from
ninety days to 270 days.84
3. Use of the Mobilization Provisions
The involuntary call-up provision of section 12304 was used only once
from 1976 to 1993.85 In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on
76. Theurer, supra note 23, at 1147 n.103 ("[i]t was thought that section 673b
authority would minimize international instability by permitting a more measured, less
alarming response to developing situations.").
77. See S. Rep. No. 1052, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007, 7008.
78. Armed Forces Reserve Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-584 (1980).
79. See S. Rep. No. 1052, supra note 77, at 7011-12. Large portions of the reserves
are activated in a mobilization exercise, in order to test their readiness at a national and
unit level, as well as that of the active forces. In one such exercise in 1978, over 25,000
reservists were needed to augment airlift capabilities, and the remaining number of
soldiers was insufficient to meet operational needs. See Theurer, supra note 23, at 1149.
80. See S. Rep. No. 1052, supra note 77, at 2. Theurer, supra note 23, at 1149 n.110
("The focus on a NATO contingency, and the need for build-up in a deepening East-West
crisis, suggest that the primary use of section 673B contemplated by Congress in 1980
was for initial preparation for a full mobilization.").
81. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3870 (1986) (codified as amended in the present
10 U.S.C. § 673B).
82. Much of the reasoning behind the increase was the result of exercises based
upon various NATO scenarios. Theurer, supra note 23, at 1150.
83. See Davis, supra note 33, at 9.
84. Pub. L. 103-337, § 511, § 1662(c)(2).
85. Prior to 1976, the reserves could be mobilized only upon declaration of war or
national emergency. See supra text accompanying note 59. President Truman declared a
national emergency and involuntarily mobilized reserves during the Korean conflict in
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August 2, 1990, President Bush ordered reserve components to active duty
under the authority of section 673B.86 By mid-February 1991, reserve
forces in the Persian Gulf exceeded 200,000.87 In early October of 1990,
Congress had expressed concern that the 180-day limit on section 673B
deployment was too short.88 On November 5, 1990, Congress passed a
specific amendment to section 673B which extended the period of activa-
tion to 360 days, applicable only to the Persian Gulf conflict.8 9 Congres-
sional resolve to enforce the time limits of section 673B was never tested,
for with the opening of hostilities against Iraq and the presidential declara-
tion of national emergency, the President could deploy one million reserv-
ists for twenty-four months under the authority of section 673(a).90
Involuntary reserve mobilization under sections 673B and 12304 has
been implemented twice since 1993. On September 15, 1994, President
Clinton ordered reservists to involuntary active duty under authority of
section 673B to support and participate in the deployment of U.S. forces to
Haiti.9 1 On December 8, 1995, President Clinton again invoked this
authority, now under section 12304, to support the deployment of U.S.
forces to Bosnia.9 2 Previous congressional concerns about the limited
duration of a reserve mobilization, expressed with regard to the Persian
Gulf conflict, were apparently remedied by the increase of the mobilization
duration to 270 days in 1994 by Congress.
The Secretary of Defense may order any reserve component unit or
member not assigned to a unit, without consent, to active duty for a period
of not more than fifteen days under section 12301(b). 93 This section is the
most well-known of the mobilization provisions, because under its author-
ity reservists are authorized and required to participate in an annual two-
1950. Proclamation No. 2194, reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1557. During the 1970
postal strike, U.S. President Richard Nixon called over 4,000 National Guard members
to active duty without their consent, but the authority for this action was under 10
U.S.C. §§ 3500 & 8500, and not conflict-related. Exec. Order No. 11,519, reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6235.
86. See supra note 48.
87. There were 214,979 reservists on active duty in the Persian Gulf on February 8,
1991. Beth Belton, War's Financial Toll: Call-Up Means Tough Times on Home Front, USA
TODAY, Feb. 19, 1991, at B1.
88. See Jeff Bovarnick, Comment, Perpich v. United States Department of Defense:
Who's in Charge of the National Guard? 26 NEv ENG. L. Ray. 435, 485 (1991). Section
673B authorizes a ninety day deployment and a ninety day extension. See supra note 44,
47 and accompanying text.
89. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511,
tit. VIII § 8132, 104 Stat. 1485, 1908 (1990).
90. Section 673 is now section 12303. See 10 U.S.C. § 12303(a). Congressional
support of President Bush's actions was explicit. See Authorization for Use of Military
Forces Against Iraq Resolution, SJ. Res. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. Rc. at 403-04
(daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 296 (1991). Given that Congress had
already extended the section 673B time limits, it is unlikely that Congress would have
objected to a continued reserve activation period, despite the language of section 673B,
unless the political climate became less supportive of the troops in the Persian Gulf.
91. Exec. Order No. 12927, supra note 48.
92. Exec. Order No. 12982, supra note 48.
93. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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week training period.94 In addition, section 12301(b) may also be the
most controversial of the mobilization provisions.
There is no explicit requirement in the language of section 12301(b)
that reservists must be on active duty for training purposes only, although
the legislative history suggests that the intent of section 12301(b) is for
training only.95 In fact, until Desert Storm, there had not been an explicit,
involuntary call-up of reserves for twenty years.96 However, reservists acti-
vated under section 672 (now section 12301) have undertaken missions
often in support of controversial U.S. foreign policy objectives.97 This par-
ticipation, even if voluntary on the part of the reservists, has engendered
popular and legal debate.
The gubernatorial consent provisions of section 12301 are the only
portions of the reserve mobilization statutes that have been considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court.98 In Perpich v. Department of Defense,99 Governor
Rudy Perpich of Minnesota challenged the deployment of Army National
Guard members from the state to Honduras for training purposes. U.S.
support of insurgency operations against the Nicaraguan Sandanistas was
then controversial. 100 At issue was whether the Congress could authorize
the President to order members of a state's National Guard to active duty
under section 672, for purposes of training, without the consent of the
state governor. 1 1 In particular, Governor Perpich challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Montgomery Amendment, which amended section 672 to
provide that "[t]he consent of a Governor . . . may not be withheld (in
whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States...
because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such
94. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 53.
95. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1034, 1039.
96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
97. Volunteer reservists have participated in every significant military action since
1973: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Grenada in 1983, Lebanon in 1986, Libya in 1986, the
Persian Gulf 1986-88, Panama in 1990, the Persian Gulf in 1990-94, and various support
operations in Haiti, Cuba area, Rwanda, Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia. See
Davis, supra note 33, at 4; Schmitt, supra note 4, at Al, A22.
98. The statutes with gubernatorial consent provisions are 10 U.S.C. § 12301(b),
supra note 55; 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d), supra note 58; 10 U.S.C. § 12301(f), supra note 60.
99. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
100. At issue was a deployment of 48 National Guard troops to Honduras in January,
1987, under the authority of section 672(b) or 672(d) (section 672 has since been re-
designated section 12301). Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 11, 38
(1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting); Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense, 666 F. Supp
1319, 1321 (1987). In the same general time period, about 42,000 National Guard
members had been deployed to 46 countries for training. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 38.
National Guard units had traditionally been deployed to Panama for jungle training,
ostensibly the same purpose of the Honduran deployment. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 37 (cit-
ing from statement of SenatorJohn Glenn in hearings before the Subcommittee on Man-
power and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services). Senator Glenn
argued that the only purpose in sending the National Guard troops to Honduras at that
particular time was to support an aspect of the Reagan administration foreign policy
with which many Americans did not agree. Id. Retired military personnel also stated in
the Hearings that the Honduran deployment was not a training necessity. Id.
101. 496 U.S. at 336.
Vol. 29
1996 Voluntary Warriors 551
active duty."'1 2 Governor Perpich contended that the Montgomery Amend-
ment had prevented him from withholding his consent to the Honduran
deployment, and that the amendment violated the Militia Clauses of the
Constitution.1
0 3
The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the Department
of Defense, 10 4 and noted that every member of the Army National Guard is
also a member of the "Reserve Corps of the Army," in that each member of
a state's National Guard also voluntarily enlisted in or accepted a commis-
sion as an officer in the National Guard of the United States.' 0 5 The Min-
nesota governor did not challenge, nor did the Court question, the
existence and validity of this dual enlistment system for the National
Guard. 10 6 Because of this dual enlistment, a National Guard member,
when ordered to active federal service, loses any status as a member of the
state militia for the period of the federal service.10 7
States do have a basic training obligation to the National Guard, and
states are entitled to rely on the National Guard in state emergency situa-
tions. 10 8 Indeed, the Montgomery Amendment does permit a gubernato-
rial veto when the federal training mission interferes with the state's ability
to respond to an emergency situation within the state.10 9 Because the
Montgomery Amendment does allow the states to veto federal service for
training in that event, there is no conflict with the Militia Clauses of the
102. Id. at 337; 10 U.S.C. § 12301(f), supra note 60. The Montgomery Amendment
was enacted as § 522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,
Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3871 (1986).
103. 496 U.S. at 337, 338. Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to pro-
vide for (1) calling forth the militia to execute federal law, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions, and (2) organizing, arming, disciplining, and governing such part of the
militia as may be employed in the federal service, reserving to the states the appointment
of officers and the power to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress. Id.
104. 496 U.S. at 355.
105. Id. at 347.
106. Id.
The dual enlistment system requires state National Guard members to simulta-
neously enroll in the National Guard of the United States (NGUS), a reserve
component of the national armed forces. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(11) and (13),
591(a), 3261, 8261; 32 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) and (7). It is an essential aspect of the
traditional military policy of the United States. 32 U.S.C. § 102.
Id.
107. Id. at 347-48. Perpich argued that interpreting the Militia clauses to allow such
federal control over the militia nullifies an important state power expressly reserved by
the Constitution. The Court disagreed and stated it was merely a recognition of the
supremacy of federal powers in military affairs. Id. at 351.
108. Id. at 351.
109. Id. Training deployments rarely involve more than several hundred Guard mem-
bers from a particular state at one time. Minnesota had approximately 13,000 National
Guard members; it is unlikely that any active federal service for training purposes will
interfere with Minnesota's, or any other state's, ability to respond to a local emergency.
Therefore, Perpich's contention that the residual veto allowed by the Montgomery
Amendment is of little use, as emergencies cannot be predicted in advance, is specious.
See id.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 29
Constitution.1 10
Perpich is significant because it affirms the principle that the federal
government controls the operational disposition of the National Guard,
without significant opportunity for dissent from the state governments. A
governor may withhold consent under section 12301 only in very circum-
scribed scenarios, which amount to the mobilization of significant num-
bers of the state's National Guard forces during a concurrent state
emergency of relatively large scope. Because operational deployments of
U.S. forces for U.N. missions are unlikely to involve large forces,1 ' the
gubernatorial consent provisions of section 12301 will probably not affect
the ability of the federal government to activate and deploy Guard forces in
support of such missions.
II. Analysis of the U.S. Statutory Framework for Reserve Mobilization
Under the authority of section 12301 and 12304, the President may order
reserve forces to active duty, with or without their consent, and without a
presidential or congressional declaration of war or national emergency." 2
Any extended deployment of large numbers of U.S. forces abroad will
require the support of reserves. With the exception of Perpich, there has
been no significant legal objection to the use of U.S. reserve forces to
advance foreign policy goals of the various administrations. However, if
such a challenge were raised, the current mobilization provisions arguably
provide a legal basis for limiting the extent of reserve involvement. Absent
a declaration of national emergency or war, the mobilization of reservists
in the U.S. for conflicts of limited size and protracted length is voluntary on
the part of reservists. Although there are proposals and interpretations
which resist this de facto result, the reality is unlikely to change.
A. Perpich Revisited
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Perpich affirmed the supremacy of the
federal government in all things military." 3 Congress was under no obli-
gation to create the gubernatorial power in section 12301(b) and 12301(d)
and was therefore free to restrict it." 4 Aside from the political issues
inherent in the state and federal military relationship, the history and lan-
guage of section 12301 may provide a basis for future objections by state
authorities to the deployment of the National Guard in support of less pop-
110. Id. The federal government provides virtually all of the funding, material, and
leadership for the State Guard units. Id. Furthermore, the states are entitled to main-
tain, at their own expense, a state defense force which is exempt from any draft into the
U.S. Armed Forces. See 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994).
111. "Large forces" as used here means a force large enough to require most of the
reservists available in any particular state at any time. The Persian Gulf War, which
involved over 600,000 servicemen in the combat theatre, did not cross this threshold.
112. See supra notes 43-47 & 58-60 and accompanying text.
113. 496 U.S. at 353 ("[T]he constitutional allocation of powers in this realm gave
rise to a presumption that federal control over the Armed Forces was exclusive.").
114. Id. at 354-55.
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ular foreign policy objectives.113
One possible argument that governors might use to withhold consent
to a section 12301 deployment of National Guard forces from their state1 16
is based on the type of units and special skils of the personnel involved,
rather than on the number of personnel. The contribution of the reserve
component to overall military capabilities has increased and will most
likely increase even more in the future.117 Simultaneously, the overall
number of reservists is decreasing.' 18 As a result, certain support special-
ties, such as water supply battalions and heavy helicopter units, are now
found entirely, or nearly so, in the reserves. 119
If one of these units were to be activated and deployed away from their
home state under section 12301, a governor might argue that consent must
be withheld, for such an activation may seriously impinge upon the state's
ability to respond to a disaster.' 20 In such a case, the Perpich Court agreed
that consent may be rightfully withheld. 121 This argument, however,
would give the governor of the special unit's state a virtual veto over any
activation, as emergencies cannot be predicted in advance. Barring any
congressional change in the language of section 12301(0, consent with-
held under such circumstances may be valid.122 The veto would be partic-
ularly essential if a state had forewarning of the possibility of a natural
disaster, such as a hurricane. The circumstances required for non-consent
appear rare and very limited. It is unlikely that a scenario enabling a
gubernatorial veto of Guard deployment will occur. It is even less likely
that such a veto would have any measurable impact upon U.S. military
deployments overseas.
B. Section 12301 and Training Purposes
The language of section 12301(b) and (d) does not make explicit that
reserve mobilization must be for training purposes. Legislative history
does suggest that a call-up under section 12301(b) be issued only for pur-
115. "[W]e of course do not pass upon the relative virtues of the various political
choices that have frequently altered the relationship between the Federal Government
and the States in the field of military affairs." Id. at 354.
116. The consent provisions of section 12301(b) and (d) are explicitly applicable only
to the Army and Air National Guard. See supra notes 55, 58.
117. See CBO RsERvE SrUDY, supra note 4.
118. The Clinton Administration plans a 24% reduction from 1990 numbers in the
Army National Guard by 1997. Id. at 44. This reduction is proceeding apace. See Scar-
borough, supra note 28, at Al.
119. As of September, 1992, the Army had five water supply battalions, two in the
Army National Guard and three in the Army Reserves. There were three heavy helicop-
ter units in the Army, all in the Army National Guard. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 156-57.
120. For instance, a water supply battalion may be instrumental in disaster relief if a
calamity were to strike a city's water supply system.
121. "The Governor and the United States agree that if federalization of the Guard
would interfere with the State Guard's ability to address a local emergency, that circum-
stance would be a valid basis for a gubernatorial veto." 468 U.S. at 351 n.24.
122. The gubernatorial veto, along with the former policy of not activating the Guard
except in time of war, are traditions and not constitutional mandates. See id. at 348-50.
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poses of training.123 Controversy arose in 1986 when DoD sought to use
an involuntary call-up under section 12301(b) as an immediate precursor
to reserve mobilization under the "200k" provision of section 12304.124
Definition of the purpose of an involuntary call-up under section 12301(b)
is conspicuously absent. Each of the other mobilization provisions speci-
fies that the purpose of a call-up is "active duty (other than for train-
ing)." 125 Furthermore, each of those provisions calls for a declaration
from either Congress or the President, or consultation with Congress.12 6
Within this statutory framework, where mobilization of the reserve forces
for the explicit purpose "other than training" must be approved or acknowl-
edged by Congress, it is illogical to assume that Congress intended reserve
forces mobilization under section 12301(b) for any purpose except
training.
National Guard troops participated in both the 1983 invasion of Gre-
nada and the 1986 raid on Libya.127 An Air National Guard tanker 128 par-
ticipated in the Libyan raid by refueling elements of the strike force. The
Guard members were assigned to a tanker task force stationed in Europe
and were activated under section 12301(d). 129 DoD policy provides that
forces activated under section 12301 are on active duty. Active duty means
not only "active duty for training," but also that they are available to meet
the operational requirements of the Theater Commander.' 30 The Total
Force Policy, whereby greater reliance is placed on reserve forces, may now
conflict with the purposes of the mobilization statutes, preparation for
123. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1034, 1039.
124. See Davis, supra note 33, at 8. Reserves mobilized under section 12301(b) may
have enabled the military to more efficiently process a larger number of reservists later
mobilized under section 12304 as well as delay possible alarm at presidential implemen-
tation of 12304, which might have signaled to various observers that a large, and per-
haps threatening, reserve mobilization was underway.
125. See supra note 60.
126. 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) (congressional declaration of war or national emergency);
10 U.S.C. § 12302(a) (presidential declaration of national emergency); 10 U.S.C.
§ 12304 (consultation with Congress).
127. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 38. In 1983, U.S. forces invaded Grenada to re-install the
democratically-elected government. See, e.g., Ed Magnuson, D-Day in Grenada, TIME,
Nov. 7, 1983, at 22. In 1986, U.S. aircraft attacked military and political targets in Libya
in response to Libya's support of international terrorism. See, e.g., George J. Church,
Hitting the Source, TIMn, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16.
128. A tanker is an aircraft used to refuel other aircraft while in-flight.
129. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 38-39.
130. DoD justified the use of reserves in the 1986 raid on Libya stating that:
The Air National Guard aircraft utilized in support of the Libyan raid were
already in Europe as part of routine tanker task force activities. Under long
standing practice, Guard and Reserve air refueling aircraft supplement active
force refueling aircraft assigned to a tanker task force stationed in Europe. The
tanker task force provides day-to-day refueling opportunities to Guard and
Reserve crews, and is also available to the theater commander to meet any opera-
tional requirement. The guard aircraft was not sent to Europe for the specific
purpose of participating in the Libyan raid. Under section 672(d) the crews can
be on active duty, including active duty for training.
Id. at 38 (statement of Secretary of the Navy Webb). No Reserve units were used in
combat, however.
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war.131 The absence of a specification of the purpose of active duty for
reservists activated under section 12301 has been used by DoD to augment
their operational requirements as the need arises, and this policy is
increasing. 132 Indeed, congressional support for the increased use of
reserves is bipartisan and very strong because increased reliance on the
reserves equates to more money and resources flowing into congressional
districts as more resources are allocated to reserve units.1 33
C. What is a "Unit"?
The mobilization statutes explicitly require that reserve units must be
ordered to active service as units, and only reservists not assigned to units
organized to serve as such may be activated as individuals. 134 Depending
on the definition of "unit," DoD may not be able to activate reservists invol-
untarily, except on a large scale.13 ' If there was no operational need for
entire units, DoD would be forced to rely upon volunteers for active duty
under section 12301(d). In the past, this has been the case. Where opera-
tional needs are relatively modest, DoD has had no difficulty meeting those
needs with volunteers.' 36 Where, however, the operational needs are
greater, volunteers may be insufficient, and DoD may need to deploy
reservists without their consent, as units, to meet those requirements. 137
131. Secretary Webb explained the problem:
[w]hat you have is the compression of missions once the Total Force Doctrine
came into effect so that you have National Guard units all over the world on any
given day under the rubric of 672, which is a problem because you have to go all
the way from 672 to a presidential 100-K call-up with very little in between.
Id.
However, the notion that the reserve mobilization statutes serve primarily as prepara-
tion and prelude to war is being challenged. For example, in congressional hearings
regarding proposed changes to the mobilization statutes, Congressman Greg Laughlin
noted, "The goal is to design a less cumbersome procedure that calls the citizen soldiers
to active duty to be able to deal with any national problem, whether a military operation,
peace-keeping force or natural disaster." Organization of Reserve Forces: Hearing of the
Military Personnel Subcomm. of the House National Security Comm., Mar. 21, 1996, at *4,
available in LEXIS, GenFed File, FNS Library. Furthermore, the goal is to ensure that
"[r]eserve component accessibility will be streamlined and the obsolete, patchwork sys-
tem designed for the Cold War will be replaced by a recall philosophy that will be
responsive to future needs." Id. at *5.
132. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at Al. DoD plans to use reserve forces to not only
augment, but to replace, active forces in such places as Kuwait and the Sinai. Id.
133. Id.
134. 10 U.S.C. § 12304(a) ("[a]ny unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organ-
ized to serve as a unit.. . ."). An exception is section 12301(d), where individuals may
volunteer for active duty. All other mobilization provisions involve involuntary
activation.
135. For instance, if "unit" was defined as a battalion or larger, the minimum number
of personnel that could be mobilized, a full battalion, would be between 550-825.
JACOBS, supra note 3, at 154.
136. In Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, the Army required Spanish lan-
guage interpreters. Rather than mobilize entire reserve civil affairs units, each with rela-
tiavely few Spanish translators, the Army solicited volunteers. Theurer, supra note 23, at
1156 n.175.
137. One proposal is to consolidate the annual training requirement of approximately
forty days into a single block. Such an initiative is expected to encounter some difficulty
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Statutory language in sections 12301(b) and 12304 bears out the defi-
nition of unit as something more than an individual, but provides no indi-
cation of the precise definition of a "unit."138 No precise clues are
provided by the dictionary definition of unit, which is "a single thing, per-
son, or group that is constituent of a whole."139 The legislative history in
the report accompanying the statute reinforces the contextual definition,
but does not add to it.140 However, the greater context of the mobilization
statutes within the Total Force Policy suggests that "unit" may be intended
to mean organizational units, such as battalions. The intention behind the
Total Force Policy was that reserve component units would fight alongside
other active units, not be consumed by them.1 41 DoD interpretation of
"unit" is anything from a two-man detachment or an aircraft crew to a
division. 142
The better interpretation, from the perspective of the operational
needs of the active armed forces, is the broad DoD definition. 143 From the
perspective of the Total Force Policy, the involuntary activation of reservists
in small numbers is to use the reserves as mere gap-fillers in the active
forces. However, the definition has not been put to any legal or political
challenge. Because there is explicit language in the legislative history
assigning no minimum size to "unit," the DoD interpretation would likely
prevail in court. 144
D. Mobilization Timing
If reserve forces were involuntarily activated to augment a protracted opera-
tional deployment, the mobilization statutes limit the time of any such acti-
vation. 145 One interpretation of these time limits is the "conventional
because of the requirements of civilian employers and possible retention/recruiting diffi-
culties caused by the lengthy deployment. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at A22.
138. See supra note 55. The word "unit" is followed by reference to individuals not
assigned to units. Unit plainly refers to something more than a single person. See id.
139. WEBsrER's N, r NEw COUEGIATE DicnoN~AY 1291 (1984).
140. S. Rep. No. 562, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975) ("the scope of this special
authority is not limited to any unit of minimum size").
141. See JAcoBs, supra note 3, at 47. The Total Force Policy envisions the reserve
component as an active and integral part of the armed forces, with its own equipment
and personnel, and not merely as a supply of gap-fillers for active duty units. See
Theurer, supra note 23, at 1156.
142. See id. at 1154.
143. See id. In operational deployments with relatively small numbers of troops,
there may be a critical need for certain reserve personnel with particular skills, but no
need for large numbers of personnel with those skills. If the need is small, there is no
point in activating nearly a thousand reservists where all but a few will have no responsi-
bility or mission once activated, but will nonetheless suffer the disruption to their civil-
ian lives which mobilization may cause.
144. DoD planning for an expanded use of the reserves is based on unit rotation,
where the units involved are often battalions or larger units. This is not to say DoD is
sensitive to the competing definitions of units, but rather that an elemental ingredient of
unit effectiveness is cohesion. As a general rule, units which have trained together are
more effective when deployed together. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at A22.
145. Where there has not been a declaration of national emergency or war, reservists
may be involuntarily activated under sections 12301(b) and 12304. Section 12301(b)
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clock."146 Under section 12304, the total time limit for reserve activation
is 270 days. Under a "conventional clock," this means that on the first day
up to 200,000 reservists could be activated and deployed. 147 On the 270th
day, if the President does not declare a national emergency and Congress
takes no further action, the activated reservists would have to be deacti-
vated.1 4 8 Reservists not subject to the first activation could not be mobil-
ized on the 270th day and deactivated on the 540th day, nor could they be
activated on the 90th day and deactivated on the 360th day. The "conven-
tional clock" places a limit not on the service time of individual reservists,
but on the time reservists in the aggregate may be activated and used in a
particular operation.
The competing definition is the "rolling clock."14 9 Under this defini-
tion, sections 12301(b) and 12304 place a time limit on the duration of
active service of the reservists mobilized. If the mobilization were under
section 12304, reservists activated on day zero would be deactivated on
day 270 and be replaced with reserves activated on day 270, whose term of
active service would extend to day 540, and so on. Using a "rolling clock,"
reservists could be deployed indefinitely. This is the interpretation favored
by DoD. 150
The plain language of the statutes favors the "rolling clock" interpreta-
tion or, at least, does not exclude it. The relevant language in section
12301(b) is "[a]n authority... may... order any unit... to active duty for
not more than 15 days a year."15 Section 12304(a) states that "[hie may
... order any unit... to active duty (other than for training) for not more
than 270 days."15 2 Section 12301(a) places clear limits on the duration of
reserve activation, "[a]n authority... may... order any unit.., to active
duty (other than for training) for the duration of the war or emergency and
for six months thereafter."15 3 Within the context of the mobilization provi-
sions, the absence of specific limitations on the duration of activation is
conspicuous. The reference to "any unit" in sections 12301(b) and 12304
is a singular reference, which could reasonably be replaced with the phrase
"any particular unit." Furthermore, section 12301(b) is the authority
limits the activation to not more than fifteen days a year. See supra note 55. Section
12304 limits the activation to 270 days. See supra note 44, 47.
146. See Theurer, supra note 23, at 1155.
147. See supra note 44, 47.
148. See Theurer, supra note 23, at 1155-56.
149. Id. at 1155.
150. "In other words, the 180 day limitation in the statute is being interpreted as a
limitation on the amount of service a reservist is subject to, rather than a limitation on
how long the President can use the Selected Reserve without a declaration of national
emergency." Id. at 1155 n.160, citing Memorandum from T.G. Hess, U.S. Marine Corps
Judge Advocate General, Manpower and Reserve Affairs: Legal Issues Related to Opera-
tion Desert Shield (5800 JAR1 Ser 8808).
151. See supra note 55.
152. See supra notes 44, 47.
153. See supra note 41. Section 12301(a) provides for the mobilization of an unlim-
ited number of reservists following a declaration of war or national emergency by
Congress.
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under which reservists are activated for their annual training. The annual
training for 1.6 million reservists does not, and could not, take place within
a single two-week window every year.' 54
At least in the context of an involuntary call-up under section 12304,
the legislative history does not support the "rolling clock" interpreta-
tion.' 55 Congress intended for section 12304 to provide the President with
the authority to initiate a substantial military response to perceived global
threats without the necessity of declaring a national emergency, as well as
to better implement the politically popular Total Force Policy.' 5 6 Congress
perceived the possibility of a "rolling clock" interpretation, but not neces-
sarily as a means to extend indefinitely the presence of reservists in an
operational theater. Rather, Congress rejected the notion of a "rolling
clock" because it would theoretically allow the President to augment the
active military beyond the level Congress had authorized.' 5 7 Ideally, sec-
tion 12304 was meant to allow the President to respond to a situation with
appropriate military force levels, possibly conclude it within 270 days, and
if necessary, to extend the reserve activation period and personnel limits
under section 12302(a) after a presidential declaration of national
emergency.158
The plain meaning of the time limits on reserve activation under sec-
tions 12301(b) and 12304 support the "rolling clock" interpretation, taken
both explicitly and implicitly. However, to apply this interpretation is to
infer that congressional concerns surrounding the duration of federaliza-
tion without a presidential or congressional declaration were focused
solely on the duration of reservists' active service. Under section 12301(b),
this inference is not unreasonable if the section is considered to be solely
for purposes of training.' 5 9 However, nothing in the legislative record sug-
gests that Congress had such a parochial concern for reservists' active ser-
vice time under section 12304. Quite the contrary, Congress was
concerned that the President might use section 12304 as a means to exceed
congressional limits. In this sense, section 12304 and the 270 day limit on
the involuntary activation of reservists is a rung in a hierarchy designed to
limit presidential action in response to a perceived military crisis. Thus,
while the "rolling clock" is a reasonable interpretation in the context of a
fifteen day activation under section 12301(b), it is an unreasonable inter-
pretation of section 12304.
Whereas the United States has a large reserve force and a complex
statutory mobilization scheme, Canada has a small reserve force and a
154. The potential effect on the economy of the U.S. if 1.6 million employers and
employees were removed annually at the same time is enormous.
155. H.R. Rep. No. 1069, supra note 66, at 1-2. Nor does it explain why the plain
language of the statute does not exclude the "rolling dock."
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2 ("[Section 12304 was] not meant to circumvent existing controls on
active duty strength through successive, unbroken call-ups of reservists.").
158. Id. See 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (1994).
159. This is a logical presumption, as a month on active service might disrupt civilian
life to such an extent that reserve recruiting and retention would be seriously hindered.
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straightforward statutory framework for reserve mobilization. Both
nations, however, share the need for reservists to augment active duty
forces in order to effectively deploy military forces.
I1. Canadian Forces Reserves
A. Reserve Component Structure
The reserve forces of the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) consist of four com-
ponents: the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet
Instructors List, and the Canadian Rangers.160 The Primary Reserve con-
sists of the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve, and the Com-
munication Reserve. 16' Only members of the Primary Reserve participate
in annual military training, and the bulk of augmentation forces for the
active CF forces come from the Primary Reserve. 162 CF reservists in the
other three components are retirees or serve in support and training
roles.' 63
There are 29,000 Primary Reservists. 164 The Militia is organized into
various combat and support units which are stationed in over 100 loca-
tions across Canada. 165 Militia units and individuals are used to augment
the Land Forces Command in order to accomplish various peacetime and
wartime missions, including U.N. peacekeeping missions.166 Naval
Reserve unit missions include performing and supporting the Maritime
Command in coastal defense and mine warfare, as well as supplying units
160. Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, Vol. I, § 2.034 (1994)
[hereinafter Q.R.& 0.]. The Supplementary Reserve consists of approximately 27,000
personnel retired from the regular forces, the Primary Reserve, and Officers of the Cadet
Instructor List. DE JONG, supra note 4, at 8. The Cadet Instructor List consists of
approximately 6,000 officers who supervise and train about 60,000 twelve to nineteen
year-old cadets of the Sea-Land-or Air Cadet Corps. Id. at 10-11. These cadets have no
formal affiliation with the CF. Id. The Canadian Rangers are comprised of approxi-
mately 2,000 volunteers who live in isolated areas, and are responsible for reporting
suspicious information and for immediate local defense pending the arrival of other
forces. Id. None of these three components participate in organized military training on
a regular basis. See Q.R. & 0., supra.
161. DEJONG, supra note 4, at 9. The CF Army Reserve is traditionally known as the
Militia. Id.
162. Id. The mission of the Primary Reserve is "to enhance the combat readiness of
the Canadian Forces, and to support Regular Force activities in peacetime." DiRcroRA-E
OF RESERvEs, THE RESERVIST. TWICE THE CrzEN 20 (1993).
163. DE JONG, supra note 4, at 8.
164. Luke Fisher, Revamping the Army, MAcLEAN's, Dec. 12, 1994, at 32.
165. There are 20,200 soldiers in the Militia. April Lindgren, Canada's Military
Reserves, OTtAWA CrnzEN, Oct. 8, 1994, at B3. Militia units are headquartered at local
armories or barracks and each unit draws personnel primarily from the local area.
There are 263 Militia units, 24 Naval Reserve units, 37 Air Reserve units, and 24 Com-
munications Reserve units in Canada. Id. at B4.
166. TwicE THE CrnzEN, supra note 162, at 22. In 1968, Canada unified its army,
navy, and air force into a unified command in order to simplify various administrative
tasks and training missions. The army became the Land Forces Command, the navy
became the Maritime Command, and the air force became the Air Command. Id. at 11.
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and individuals to integrate with the regular forces. 167 Air Reserve units
operate aircraft for light transport missions and in support of peacekeeping
missions. 168 The Communications Reserve is equipped with communica-
tion equipment and supports CF regular forces on virtually every opera-
tion, domestically or abroad. 169
B. CF Reserves: A Significant Role
CF active personnel number 74,900 and the CF reserves have 29,000
reservists. 170 With the withdrawal of Canadian heavy forces deployed in
Europe to support NATO, the primary overseas focus of the CF is the sup-
port of U.N. peacekeeping missions.171 Since 1947, Canada has taken part
in every U.N. peacekeeping mission. 172 CF reserves have had a significant
role in support of these peacekeeping missions, and the reserve contribu-
tion is likely to increase in the future. 173
167. DE JONG, supra note 4, at 10. There are approximately 4,100 personnel in the
Naval Reserve. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
168. There are about 1600 personnel in the Air Reserve. Id. The Air Reserve is
equipped primarily with C-130s (a medium transport aircraft) and light helicopters.
TWIcE THE CrzEN, supra note 162, at 22.
169. There are about 1600 personnel in the Communications Reserve. Lindgren,
supra note 165, at B3.
170. Id. The Canadian government plans to reduce the number of active duty CF
personnel to 60,000 and reservists to 23,000 by 1999. David Pugliese, Forces Over-
stocked Despite Cuts, OTrAWA CrnzEN, Mar. 18, 1996, at Al.
171. Canada's commitment of heavy land forces to NATO defensive missions in
Europe ended with the Cold War. Peacekeeping, however, is extremely popular in Can-
ada. The strategic justification for Canada's participation in peacekeeping missions was
once based on the notion that the chance of a superpower confrontation was lessened if
small conflicts were kept small. Given Canada's geographic location between the U.S.
and the former U.S.S.R., such a strategy once made sense. With the demise of the Soviet
Union, it is arguable that Canada cannot justify peacekeeping support in terms of
domestic security. See Peter Saracino, More Tasks, Fewer Means, JANE's DEF. WKLY., Oct.
3, 1992, at 28.
172. Canadian Forces have participated in the following U.N. peacekeeping missions:
UNTCOK (Korea, 1947-48), UNMOGIP (Kashmir, 1949-79), UNTSO (former Palestine,
1948-present), ICSC (Southeast Asia, 1965-74), UNEF I (Sinai, 1956-67), UNOGIL (Leb-
anon, 1958), ONUC (Congo, 1960-64), UNSF (West Irian, 196263), UNYOM (Yemen,
1963-64), UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1964-1993), DOMREP (Dominican Republic, 1965-66),
UNIPOM (India-Pakistan, 1965-66), UNEF II (Sinai-Suez, 1973-79), ICCS (Vietnam,
1973), UNDOF (Golan Heights, 1974-present), UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978-present), MFO
(Sinai, 1986-present), UNGOMAP (Afghanistan, 1988-90), UNIIMOG (Iran-Iraq, 1988-
91), UNTAG (Namibia, 1989-1990), ONUCA (Central America, 1989-92), OSGAP
(Afghanistan-Pakistan, 1990-present), ONUVEH (Haiti, 1990-91), UNIKOM (Kuwait,
1991-present), MINURSO (Western Sahara, 1991-present), UNAVEM II (Angola, 1991-
present), ECCMY (former Yugoslavia, 1991-present), ONUSAL (El Salvador, 1991-pres-
ent), UNTAC (Cambodia, 1991), UNPROFOR I & II (former Yugoslavia, 1992-present),
UNOSOM (Somalia, 1992-95), ONUMOZ (Western Sahara, 1993-present), UNOMUR
(Rwanda, 1993-94). SeeJOSEPH T. JOCKEL, CANADA & INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 69-77
(1994); SENATE OF CANADA, MEErING NEw CHALLENGES: CANADA's RESPONSE TO A NEw
GENERATION OF PEACEKEEPING 85-90 (1993) [hereinafter MEETING NEw CHALLENGES].
173. Following World War II, Canadian domestic support for peacekeeping was luke-
warm. Because peacekeeping missions were seen as merely a drain on military
resources, the first CF deployments for peacekeeping were small and composed entirely
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1. A Historical Perspective
Canadian defense policy in the 1960s and 1970s essentially neglected the
reserves in favor of regular forces.174 This preference was in large measure
a result of skepticism about the value of reserve forces in the nuclear age, as
well as a political philosophy which emphasized the diplomatic credit
active forces could provide. 175 The Canadian government felt that active
forces, particularly those stationed in Europe, allowed Canada a voice in
international and European policy decisions that it would not otherwise
have had with reserve forces.17 6 In the mid-1980s, the government of
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sought to reverse this policy.
1 7 7
With insufficient reserves in the event of a European War, the government
feared that Canada would be left with inadequate forces for domestic use,
would have a limited ability to support troops in the European theater, and
would suffer personnel shortages as battle casualties depleted the regular
forces.17 8
A modernization program for the reserves in 1987 addressed these
concerns. This policy, the "total force concept," called for an expansion
and modernization of the reserves, particularly the Militia. 179 In addition
to reserve expansion, this policy called for the reorganization of the CF,
especially the Land Forces Command, into a structure where reservists and
reserve units would take on some regular force missions and be prepared
for rapid incorporation into the regular forces.' 8 0 The overall goal of the
total force policy was to maintain the general-purpose combat ability of the
CF.18 1 A subsidiary goal was for the reserve to augment the regular forces
in peacetime if the need arose.
18 2
2. Present Use and Status of the CF Reserves
A need for reserve augmentation of the active forces emerged under the
auspices of global peacekeeping. While the CF reserves did not participate
in a significant way in peacekeeping missions (except the small initial mis-
of reservists. This was the case with the 1954 ICSC deployment to Indochina. See
JocKEL, supra note 172, at 11.
174. During this period Canada was the only NATO country where regular forces
outnumbered reservists. Id. at 34.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 35.
178. Id.
179. Id. The similarities between Canada's "total force concept" and the U.S. "total
force policy" are significant. The strikingly similar total force concepts may have arisen
because they are the most sound military policy. However, a better explanation is that
the total force policies are not motivated merely by strategic goals, but also by fiscal
ones.
180. Id. "For the most part, tasks will be assigned to the Canadian Forces as a whole
rather than specifically to Regulars or Reservists. Structures will be adopted to enable
the use of a combination of Regulars and Reservists as circumstances dictate .... " Id.
181. In practice, this results in the CF's three brigade groups being about 40% under-
strength in peacetime, while some smaller units have only 10% of their wartime strength
as regulars in peacetime. Id.
182. Id. at 36.
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sions) through the 1980s, the total force policy has resulted in significant
contributions of the reserves to CF overseas deployment.183 Presently,
however, about twenty percent of the forces deployed on peacekeeping mis-
sions are reservists.184
The total force policy, with a generally increased reserve role in the
regular military and particularly in peacekeeping missions, is not without
controversy. In hearings before committees of both the Senate and House
of Commons in 1992-93, doubts were expressed as to the combat ability of
the reservists, although their performance in relatively tranquil peacekeep-
ing operations was viewed favorably. 185 The Senate Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs noted that the total force policy (and the extensive
deployment of reservists) was leading to an erosion of the high level of
training and readiness which characterized the CF and earned Canada a
reputation for providing extremely high-caliber troops for peacekeeping
missions. 18 6
While the reserves are actively and significantly involved in contempo-
rary peacekeeping operations, the role of reserves in peacekeeping opera-
tions in the future is uncertain. Some in Canada have proposed that the
military essentially be eliminated. 18 7 In November 1994, the Liberal Party
cabinet approved a policy statement calling for the reduction of CF regular
forces from 74,900 to 60,000 by 1999.188 The Primary Reserve is to be
reduced to 23,000, from 29,000, also by 1999.189 In light of these regular
and reserve force reductions, the CF has been considering proposals to
substantially change the role of the CF in peacekeeping operations.190
183. Since 1947, over 90,000 Canadian troops have participated in peacekeeping
operations. Playing a Part in Keeping the Peace, JNE's DEF. WKLY., Oct. 3, 1992, at 38.
Between 1976-1990, only about 1000 reservists served on peacekeeping missions.
JOcKEI, supra note 172, at 34.
184. Playing a Part in Keeping the Peace, supra note 183, at 38. Since 1991, almost
3000 reservists have served with the regular forces on peacekeeping missions outside
Canada. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
185. JoocEL, supra note 172, at 36 (citing testimony of Major General MacKenzie in
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans
Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Feb. 18, 1993, at 33:6).
186. MEETING NEw CHALLENGES, supra note 172, at 77. The report noted that reserve
units have been viable only after substantial augmentation by regular force leadership.
Id. The success of American specialist and logistics reserve units in Desert Storm was
also noted, and it was suggested that the CF expand the numbers and use of non-combat
reserve units. Id. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs of
the House of Commons ultimately recommended that reservist training be increased,
and that reserve participation in peacekeeping missions be limited to 25%, unless the
operation was more dangerous (such as the former Yugoslavia) where the limit should
be 10%. Jocna, supra note 172, at 36.
187. Bob Bergen, Forcing the Issue, CALGARY HEmD, Oct. 4, 1994, at AS. Professor
Ivan Head, a law professor, stated that, through peacekeeping, Canada has "influence at
the United Nations and in other international institutions far beyond our place in the
hierarchy of states." Id. Professor Head decries the cost of maintaining the armed
forces at the expense of "other things." Id.
188. Fisher, supra note 164, at 32.
189. Id.
190. Two concepts have been proposed. The first is the Vanguard Concept, where CF
forces would participate only in the initial phase of a peacekeeping operation, which is
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There are several objections, aside from combat efficacy, to any
expanded reserve role, or indeed, to much of a reserve role at all. The first
is cost. Primary Reserve units cost only about ten percent less than their
active duty counterparts in peacetime. 191 This is a considerably smaller
differential than between reserve and regular force costs in the United
States.192 CF reservists, with considerably less training than regular
forces, do not result in considerable savings.' 93 The remaining two objec-
tions are statutory: legal service obligations of reservists and statutory pro-
tection of civilian employment for reservists serving with the regular
forces.194
C. The Statutory Framework for Mobilizing CF Reserves
The statutory framework for mobilizing the CF reserve is considerably sim-
pler than its U.S. counterpart.' 9 ' CF reserves may either be involuntarily
mobilized in the case of certain emergencies 196 or they may serve volunta-
rily. 197 Under the present statutory arrangement, the CF reserves cannot
be compelled to serve on active duty unless there is an emergency. 198
1. Mobilizing CF Reserves in the Case of Emergency
Section 31 of the National Defence Act provides that the Governor in Coun-
cil' 99 may place the Canadian Forces, or any element or individual of the
Canadian Forces, on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada in the
case of an emergency for the defence of Canada or action undertaken by
Canada under the terms of an instrument of collective defence. 200 An
generally regarded as the most critical phase. The second proposal is to form a corps of
dedicated peacekeepers from the reserves, or as a separate organization. The Vanguard
Concept is not attractive to the U.N. A Reserve Corps is not favored in the CF because of
the statutory obligation of Canadian Reservists, and contracting out peacekeeping duties
to civilians is not seriously considered. Jocie., supra note 172, at 36-40.
191. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
192. See supra text accompanying note 24. Reserve units in the U.S. cost about 300/ -
40% less than their active duty counterparts.
193. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3. The CF reserves consumed Can$1.028 billion
in 1994, out of a total defense budget of Can$11.5 billion. Id. To put this number in
perspective, the 1994 budget of the U.S. Army National Guard alone was $5.9 billion,
which represents only 2.3% of the entire U.S. Department of Defense budget for fiscal
year 1994. National Guard and Reserve Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Force
Requirements and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
206 (1994) (statement of Major General John R. D'Araujo, Director, Army National
Guard) [hereinafter Statement of Maj. Gen. D'Araujo].
194. See Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
195. See supra parts LC. & II.
196. See R.S.C. ch. N-5, § 31 (1994) (Can.).
197. See Q.R.&O., vol. I, § 9.05 (1994).
198. JocKL, supra note 172, at 38-39.
199. The term "Governor in Council" means that the government may order such
action without prior parliamentary approval. See S.M. WADDAMS, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF LAw 136 (1983).
200. R.S.C. ch. N-5, § 31 (1994) (Can.) states in relevant part that:
3. (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any compo-
nent, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member
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emergency is defined as "war, invasion, riot or insurrection, real or
apprehended."201
The government, under the authority of section 31(1)(b), may order
CF reserves to active service without their consent in action taken by Can-
ada under an instrument of collective defence. 20 2 While this section would
seem to allow involuntary mobilization of the reserves "in consequence of
any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter," this
does not authorize the government to mobilize reserves for peacekeeping
missions. 20 3 This is because the section states that such mobilization for
active service must be under the auspices of an instrument of collective
defense. 20 4 Peacekeeping missions, while under the auspices of the U.N.
Charter, are not a response mandated by the Charter for collective
defence. 20 5
2. Mobilizing CF Reserves for Training
Section 33(2) of the National Defence Act provides authority for the gov-
ernment to order the reserve forces to training and for military duty other
than training.20 6 However, except in the case of emergency, nothing in this
section obligates a reservist to perform military duty of any sort.20 7 In the
words of the Directorate of Reserves:
thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it
appears advisable to do so
(a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United
Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument
for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.
201. R.S.C. ch. N-5, § 2 (1994) (Can.).
202. R.S.C. ch. N-5, § 31(1)(b) (1994) (Can.).
203. Id.
204. "Reservists are liable for compulsory military service... if placed on active ser-
vice by reason of an emergency for the defense of Canada or as a result of Canadian
actions under the terms of a collective defence agreement, such as the North Atlantic
Treaty .... " Twice THE CrzaN, supra note 162, at 23.
205. "Peacekeeping is a U.N. intervention. It was not specifically defined in the char-
ter but evolved as a noncoercive instrument of conflict control ...." Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, FoPGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 89. However, in
particular cases, the U.N. Charter is an instrument of collective defense. Article 51 pro-
vides for "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... " U.N. CHARTmi art. 51.
206. R.S.C. ch. N-5, § 33 (1994) (Can.) provides in relevant part that:
33. (2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers
and non-commissioned members thereof
(a) may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations
made by the Governor in Council, and
(b) may be called out on service to perform any military duty other than
training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise
are prescribed by the Governor in Council.
207. Q.R.&O., vol I, § 9.04(3) states that "[iln an emergency, the Minister may call
out on service to perform any military duty other than training, such officers and non-
commissioned members of the Reserve Force... and such units and other elements
thereof as he may consider necessary."
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You should not allow your military service to affect your work or school ....
On the other hand, a lot of time and effort goes into organizing your train-
ing, and it's all wasted if you don't show up. You have an obligation, if only
a moral one, to follow through on the commitment you made when you
joined.20 8
Except in the case of emergency,2o 9 CF reservists are not obligated to train
or to perform military duties other than training.2 10 The federal govern-
ment may obligate the reservists to perform active service in the case of
emergency, but this has not happened since the Second World War.
2 1 1
IV. Comparison Between the U.S. and CF Reserve Mobilization
Statutory Framework
Given the statutory restrictions on the involuntary mobilization of CF
reserves, many of the issues raised by the U.S. statutory framework are
absent. Reservists who volunteer for active duty alongside the regular
forces comprise the bulk of CF reserve force augmentation to the active
forces. 2 12 This reliance on voluntary service may ultimately be detrimental
to the international deployment of the CF for any mission short of war or
insurrection within Canada. However, the statutory restrictions on the
involuntary deployment of U.S. reserve forces, in effect, prevent the U.S.
government from deploying reserve forces to support an overseas mission
of extended length except on a voluntary basis. Given that international
operations involving the regular forces of both nations will require reserve
augmentation, the United States is in a better position to conduct those
operations with necessary reserve support. This is because the U.S. statu-
tory framework encourages voluntary mobilization, and because the
United States simply has a larger pool of reservists who may volunteer.
A. Statutory Support for Voluntary Mobilization
Employers of CF reservists are under no obligation to refrain from penaliz-
ing, or even firing, CF reservists who are absent from their civilian employ-
ment because they are on active service.2 13 Rather than adopt legislation
protecting the civilian jobs of reservists, the government has sought to per-
suade employers to adopt policies amenable to reserve service.
214
208. Twice THE CrrzEN, supra note 162, at 23.
209. An emergency exists in the case of war, invasion, or insurrection. See supra note
200 and accompanying text.
210. "[R]eservists aren't obliged to report for duty when needed. That hasn't been a
problem so far, but the auditor general in 1992 said only about one-third of reservists
would turn out during an emergency and less than half would show up for combat
assignment outside Canada." Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3. CF reservists do train,
however, usually between 35-40 days annually, even though there is no legal obligation
to do so. Id. See Q.t.&O., vol. I, § 9.04(2) (1994) (reservists may be ordered to train for
up to 15 days continuously and 60 days non-continuously, each year).
211. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
212. See Q.R&O., vol. I, § 9.05 (1994) ("Service With Consent").
213. Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
214. Id. Such legislation is resisted because it is felt that employers with reservists
would be at a competitive disadvantage with other employers without reservists. There-
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Although the Canadian government has expended significant resources to
promote employer support of reserve service, the effort has been largely
unsuccessful.
2 1 5
Comparatively, the U.S. protects the civilian employment of reservists
by operation of statute.216 Protection is accorded to reservists regardless
of whether the active service is voluntary or involuntary. 217 While it is
difficult to quantify the precise effect these differing policies have had on
the number of reservist volunteers, it is nonetheless substantial.218 A
Canadian reservist facing the loss of civilian employment on return from a
limited duration period of active duty has a strong disincentive to volunteer
in the first place.219
This is not to say that the effective reliance on voluntary mobilization
of reservists in the United States will necessarily continue. In addition to
interpretive methods of escaping statutory restrictions on U.S. reserve
mobilization, such as the definition of "unit" and the "rolling clock," there
have been efforts in the U.S. to make reserve deployment less of a voluntary
affair. 220 Members of the reserves have asked Congress to reconsider the
reliance on volunteer reservists.221 Congress has modified Section 12304
to allow for 270 day involuntary deployment of reservists instead of ninety
days. Another proposal would allow the President to order to active service
only 25,000 reservists. 222 President Clinton did mobilize a small number
of reservists involuntarily under 10 U.S.C. § 673B in support of the inva-
fore, reservists themselves would be at a disadvantage in the job market because employ-
ers would be less willing to hire them. Id.
215. Id. The Directorate of Reserves states that:
In the first place, all companies, through paying taxes, contribute financially to
the nation's defence-which means to the Canadian Forces. Since the Reserve is
a large, and increasingly important, part of the Forces, those companies that do
not support their reservists are not really encouraging the best use of their own
tax dollars.
TwICE THE CrnzEN, supra note 162, at 70.
216. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-16 (1994); Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, The
Return from Uniformed Service, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 5, 1994, at 3.
217. 38 U.S.C. § 4304(b)(2) (1994).
218. See Lindgren, supra note 165, at B3.
219. Many CF reservists must choose between active service and their job. Some
choose active service, although this is not the norm. Alan Hustak, Quebec Reservists
Begin Their Training for Six-Month Stint in Bosnia-Hercegovina, OTrAwA CrrZEN, Jan. 24,
1993, at A4. "Until we get laws like that [in the U.S.] protecting us, some people will
have to make sacrifices if they want to participate in humanitarian missions . I..." id
220. See supra part lI.D.
221. Mobilize Reservists Rather than Plan for Volunteers, U.S. NawswIRE, June 5, 1991,
available in NEXIS, News Library, Wires File. "[Flor the Department of Defense leader-
ship to consistently expect reservists to volunteer in their needed skills and numbers
and in a timely manner is a form of abdication of responsibility by the Pentagon." Id.
(punctuation omitted).
222. This proposal has not yet made it out of committee recommendations, however.
See S. Rep. No. 103-112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. Rep. 103-449, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994).
1996 Voluntary Warriors
sion of Haiti in 1994223 and again in 1995 to support operations in
Bosnia.22 4
B. Voluntary Reserve Mobilization and the Implications for
Peacekeeping
Canada, with a small military establishment and a voluntary reserve policy,
has contributed significantly to peacekeeping missions since the reserve's
inception.225 The U.S., with a very large military and a de facto voluntary
reserve policy, has contributed relatively few military personnel to
223. Exec. Order No. 12927, 30 WEnY Comp. Pmus. Doc. 1778 (1994); See Peter
Mackler, Clinton Lobbies Skeptical Americans on Haiti Invasion, AGENCE FRANIE PRESSE,
Sep. 15, 1994, available in NEXIS, News library, Arcnws File.
224. See supra note 48.
225. Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions:
Mission Location Year Personnel Type
UNTCOK Korea 47-48 2 Observers
UNMOGIP Kashmir 49-79 27 Observers, Air Lift
UNTSO former 54- 22 Observers
Palestine
ICSC Southeast 54-72 133 Observers
Asia
UNEF I Sinai 56-67 1007 Armored Cavalry, Support and
Logistics, Air Lift
UNOGIL Lebanon 58 77 Observers
ONUC Congo 60-64 421 Communications, Air Lift
UNTEA West Irian 62-63 13 Air Lift
UNYOM Yemen 63-64 36 Observers, Air Lift
UNFICYP Cyprus 64-93 1126 Armored Cavalry, Infantry,
Communications, Military Police
DOMREP Dom. Rep. 65-66 1 Observer
UNIPOM India- 65-66 112 Observers
Pakistan
UNEF I Sinai 56-67 1007 Armored Cavalry, Engineers,
Logistics, Communications, Air Lift
UNEF II Sinai-Suez 73-79 1145 Communications, Logistics, Military
Police, Air Lift
ICCS Vietnam 73 248 Observers
UNDOF Golan Hgts 74- 230 Communications, Logistics
UNIFIL Lebanon 78- 117 Communications, Military Police
MFO Sinai 86- 140 Air Lift, Staff
UNGOMAP Afghanistan 88-91 5 Observers
UNIIMOG Iran-Iraq 88-91 525 Communications, Observers
UNTAG Namibia 89-90 301 Logistics, Air Lift
ONUCA Central 89-92 175 Observers, Air Lift
OSGAP
ONUVEH
UNIKOM
MINURSO
UNAVEM II
ECMMY
ONUSALEl
UNTAC
America
Afghanistan
Haiti
Kuwait
Western
Sahara
Angola
former
Yugoslavia
Salvador
Canbodia
90-
90-91
91-
91-
91-
91-
91-
91
Military Advisor
Observers
Observers, Engineers
Observers
Observers
Monitors
11 Staff
213 Observers, Staff, Engineers,
Transportation
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peacekeeping operations.226 As domestic fiscal imperatives require
nations to place greater military reliance on reserves, the statutory frame-
work for reserve mobilization becomes more important. The Canadian
peacekeeping experience has demonstrated that a reserve statutory frame-
work based on voluntary mobilization can succeed.
The United States, with much greater military and fiscal resources, is
planning and allocating a larger role to voluntary reservists. The Opera-
tional Integration Program has been developed by DoD specifically to
enhance U.S. peacekeeping ability. 2 27 This program will provide compos-
ite units, comprised of regular soldiers and volunteers from the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve.228 The unit will undergo training and
then be deployed for six month rotations in multinational observer and
peacekeeping missions.229 The first composite unit has already deployed
to the Sinai. 230 U.S. reserve forces will also be deployed on a voluntary
basis for forty-five day international relief missions under the Operational
Unit Program.23 1 These Army National Guard units, selected because of
their experience in providing support in domestic disaster relief assistance,
are prepared to deploy on seventy-two hours notice.232 Other reserve units
UNPROFOR I former 92- 2300 Infantry, Engineers, Military Police,
& II Yugoslavia Staff
UNOSOM Somalia 92-95 1300 Infantry, Air Support, Staff,
Logistics
ONUMOZ Western 93- 15 Observers
Sahara
UNOMUR Rwanda 93-94 1 Command
SeeJocKEL, supra note 172, at 69-77; MEETING NEW CHALLENGES, supra note 172, at 85-
90.
226. U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions was practically non-existent
before 1993, with the exception of Korea. See UNrrE NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMErs (2d
ed. 1990). In 1993, there were twenty-four peacekeeping missions underway across the
globe, involving 75,000 troops, 5,600 of them American. Barry R. McCaffrey, U.S. Mili-
tary Support for Peacekeeping Operations, in PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND THE U.S.
MI=ARY 4 (Dennis J. Quinn ed., 1994). The cost of these operations was about $4
billion, and the U.S. paid approximately one-third of this cost. Id. In 1994, 63,138
troops were involved in peacekeeping and as observers; 817 were American. Carla Anne
Robbins, GOP Bid to Downgrade U.N. Peacekeeping Role Is Likely to Gain Steam in House
Vote Today, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1995, at A16. The cost of these missions to the U.N. was
$3.5 billion, of which $1.1 billion was assessed to the U.S. Id. The U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill in February, 1995, which would dramatically limit presidential
authority to commit forces to U.N. peacekeeping missions. See National Security Revi-
talization Act, H.. 7, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Senate has not yet voted on the
bill. The National Security Revitalization Act would significantly reduce U.S. funding
for U.N. peacekeeping operations, and it would require the President to consult with
Congress prior to the deployment of U.S. forces on U.N. missions. See, e.g., David Hess,
House OKs Limiting U.N. Ties, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Feb. 17, 1993, at 12A.
227. Statement of Maj. Gen. D'Araujo, supra note 193, at 206.
228. 75% of the soldiers are volunteers from the Army National Guard. Id. This pro-
gram is unique because it would collect reservist volunteers from many different units,
organize and train them as a new unit, and deploy the "hybrid" unit. See id.
229. Id.
230. Bradley Graham, Reserve Troops Get Their Shot at Active Duty, WASH. POST, Dec.
12, 1994, at Al.
231. Statement of Maj. Gen. D'Araujo, supra note 193, at 205-06.
232. Id.
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will deploy on a follow-on basis, also for forty-five days, to replace previ-
ously deployed units.233 These units are not composites of volunteers, but
units in existence.234
If there are sufficient personnel and resources, deployment as units,
even as composite units of volunteers from various reserve units, is argua-
bly preferable to a policy of individual replacement.235 CF reserves are
deployed as individuals, and this policy has magnified reserve training
inadequacies and hindered the formation of unit cohesion.236 The capabil-
ity to deploy reserve units on a voluntary basis is at least partially a func-
tion of the statutory requirement of reserve civilian employment rights.
237
It is possible, as Canada has demonstrated, to deploy effective military
forces on peacekeeping missions from a small regular force augmented by
a small pool of voluntary reservists. The U.S., with far greater resources,
can also effectively deploy forces on multinational missions with voluntary
reserve augmentation. In addition, the U.S. has implemented programs,
such as the Operational Unit and the Operational Integration Programs,
designed to use voluntary reservists in ways unavailable to, but arguably
more effective than, the Canadian experience. While the statutory frame-
work for reserve mobilization in the U.S. may not be satisfactory to critics
who seek a framework less oriented to voluntary mobilization, the CF have
demonstrated that such a framework does work.
Conclusion
The United States has both large regular and reserve forces. Congress has
created an intricate web of statutory controls which limits the ability of the
President to mobilize reserve forces in times short of war or national emer-
gency. While there are arguments which would allow the statutory frame-
work to be read in a light permitting small-scale involuntary mobilization
of the U.S. reserves, these arguments are not supported by legislative his-
tory. The better interpretation of the statutory framework, and one sup-
ported by the past use of the authority granted by the mobilization statutes,
is that U.S. reservists cannot be involuntarily mobilized to support the reg-
ular forces when involved in an operation of limited scope.
Canada has a significantly smaller regular military and reserve force
than the United States. The reserves of the Canadian Forces cannot be
mobilized involuntarily, except in the case of war, by operation of statute
and policy. Despite this limitation, Canadian reservists routinely augment
233. Id.
234. These units are not composed of a collection of volunteers from various units,
but will be deployed as the same unit in which they train. See id.
235. See supra notes 16-17 for a discussion of the inefficacy of the individual replace-
ment policy of the U.S. military in Vietnam.
236. Volunteer reservists who train on a limited, part-time basis are put in units along-
side regular force troops with considerably more experience and training. In some
cases, the reservist may be more of a liability than an asset to the unit. See David Pug-
liese, Is Total Force a 'total farce'?, ToRoNTro STAR, Mar. 13, 1993, at D5.
237. Perhaps to a greater extent it is also a function of the number of available reserv-
ists. The U.S. has a reserve pool approximately thirty-five times larger than Canada.
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regular Canadian forces which operate throughout the world in support of
U.N. peacekeeping missions. Like the United States, the Canadian reserv-
ists who augment regular forces do so on a purely voluntary basis. In addi-
tion, the United States has additional statutory protections, not available to
Canadian reservists, which generally provide incentives to reservists to
volunteer.
In spite of these statutory differences, the Canadian Forces have partic-
ipated significantly in U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1947, while U.S.
forces have not. Given that fiscal imperatives require that both nations rely
more heavily on reserve forces, a legal framework which allows for the use
of those reserves provides significant force utilization advantages. Cana-
dian experience indicates that express reliance on a completely voluntary
reserve mobilization system can, and does, work As the United States con-
templates the future role of its military in U.N. missions, as well as the
complex legal structure which has evolved to regulate reserve mobilization,
the simple and effective Canadian example should not be overlooked.
